Islamic Militancy

General Musharraf has also claimed that the courts are hampering his

efforts to stem the Islamic militancy in the tribal areas, the creeping

talibanization of Pakistan’s northwestern province, and the suicide

bombing that have erupted across major cities over the past few years.

But the Courts have only insisted on the rule of law. Musharraf’s

failure to effectively counter the militancy springs from more other

causes.

The most important problem has been the military regime itself and its

policies towards the Islamic political parties and militants. In need of

some kind of political cover after seizing power in 1999, Musharraf and

his generals cobbled together an alliance of opportunistic politicians,

defectors from other parties and the Islamist political parties.This militarymullah

alliance in Pakistan stretches back over 30 years, and was

central in the U.S.-backed jihad against the Soviet Union in

Afghanistan of the 1980s and the Kashmir insurgency of the 1990s.

When not offering direct support, the Musharraf regime has preferred

neglect and appeasement of Islamist political parties and militants.

Islamic laws are allowed to stay on the books. Militant groups are

grudgingly banned in public and privately allowed to operate. Whether

is in the tribal areas of Waziristan or the militant take-over of the Red

Mosque in the heart of Islamabad, Musharraf and his generals

preferred to ignore it, and then make concessions to the militants in

the vain hope that the problem would go away.