Statement by the Editorial Advisory Committee

In November 2007, eight years after he first seized power in a coup,

and six years after declaring himself president of Pakistan, General

Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency, suspended the

Constitution and basic rights, and dismissed the Supreme Court.

Musharraf claimed that the emergency was needed to stem the

growing Islamic militancy in Pakistan. But his Proclamation of

Emergency was a litany of complaints about the Pakistani courts, the

only branch of government that the general and his army did not

control, for having “weakened the writ of the government.” Musharraf

also banned independent television and clamped down on the print

media, because he said it was “demoralizing the nation.” Washington

was alerted to Musharraf’s impending action. Admiral William Fallon,

the head of US military forces in West Asia, met Musharraf in

Islamabad the day before the coup, and is reported to have warned the

general against declaring an emergency. US officials said that “General Musharraf had been offering private assurances that any

emergency declaration would be short-lived.”

Musharraf’s actions incited protests across the country, led by

lawyers, human rights and democracy activists, students and civil

society groups. These have been met with tear gas, beatings and mass

arrests. The government admitted to detaining over 5000 people. After

42 days, Musharraf gave up the post of Chief of Army Staff,

announced the ‘lifting’ of the emergency and said the constitution was

being restored. The restored constitution has been amended by decree

to protect Musharraf from legal challenge and gives him enhanced

powers as president. He has also appointed a new Supreme Court,

established a law to allow military courts to try civilians, and imposed

restriction on the media specifically preventing criticism of him and

the army.

Pakistan has been here before, as have many of its neighbours in

South Asia. Insecure and undemocratic leaders, weak regimes, a

society that cannot hold its state machinery in check. It is far from

certain that these steps will give Musharraf the unchecked power or

the legitimacy that he and the army seek. The crisis in Pakistan may

be too deep and too fundamental for such easy solutions.

The test for Musharraf, his supporters, and his opponents will come

with the January 2008 elections. The Musharraf government is widely

expected to rig these elections if only to ensure that its opponents do

not win a clear majority and threaten Musharraf’s continued role as

President. Washington has already accepted that “It’s not going to be

a perfect election.” A recent poll found that 70 percent of Pakistanis believed the Musharraf government did not deserve re-election and 67

percent wanted Musharraf to resign immediately.