land was allotted in smallholdings of up to 50 acres, and grantees were chosen not from the
landless rural poor, or the lowly ‘service castes’ in indigenous hierarchy, but from hereditary
landholding castes. Their proprietary rights had been acknowledged by the British in return for
land revenue payments, which were the chief source of state revenue. These were also the
same elements that were being heavily recruited into the British Indian military after 1857, with
the Punjab alone accounting for over half the total army. Sizeable areas were also allocated for
larger landholdings, thereby shoring up the landlord stratum, which served as an essential
intermediary for imperialist rule.
In institutional terms, the authority of both the military and the state bureaucracy were
significantly strengthened in the emergent hydraulic society. Significant landed resources were
reserved for grants to army pensioners and then veterans of the two world wars, as well as for
the breeding of cavalry horses. The native bureaucracy also gained stature from control over
irrigation water, land allotments, and land transfers and mutations; and was heavily embroiled in
rent seeking. The post-1947 dominance of the military and bureaucracy, and the continued
authority of the landlord element leveraging on rich peasant support, were underlined by their
consolidation during colonial rule. By contrast, business groups had also emerged with the
major increase in trade, processing and distribution of agricultural commodities; but their access
to canal irrigated land was limited to auction purchases. Since they were predominantly non-
Muslim in composition, their exit to India in 1947 further emasculated the prospects of the
business segment posing any major challenge to the traditional order. The exclusion of the rural
poor before 1947, from both electoral enfranchisement and occupancy access to landed
resources, also reflected their continued neglect in the structure of state expenditures after
decolonization.
The Pakistani state then continued for the next half century to abide by the political economy
modes established under imperialist tutelage. Arguably, as later developments were to show,
within supposed sovereignty imperialist control remained pivotal in the exercise of authority,
albeit with a shift away from Britain to a new hegemon. For one, a vital consequence of the
British success at maneuvering agricultural colonization to their own political advantage had
been an extremely weak nationalist stimulus in the region that became Pakistan. Only in the
frontier province did a political grouping, led by Ghaffar Khan and allied to the Indian National
Congress, displayed nationalist sentiments and achieved electoral success. Significantly, in
Pakistan Ghaffar Khan was humiliated, imprisoned and exiled. In Punjab and Sindh, the British
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